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“Tricking the Sails” of Post-World War One Public
Opinion: John Maynard Keynes and The Economic
Consequences of the Peace
Daniel J. Knickrehm
Univ. of Iowa

The Economic Consequences of the Peace has a claim to be regarded as
Keynes’s best book. In none of his others did he succeed so well in bringing all his
gifts to bear on the subject in hand. Although the heart of the book was a lucid
account of the reparation problem, the book was no mere technical treatise. [i]

Thinking about John Maynard Keynes in terms of the trickster reveals the
strength behind his influence in 20th century international relations and economics.
While for a large portion of his life he was not in a position to affect direct change in
British policy, his role as author, advisor and educator gave Keynes a significant
indirect influence on public opinion as well as governmental policy. There can be
little doubt that Keynes’ polemic Economic Consequences of the Peace[ii] carried a
serious and dire message to the people of war-torn Europe that the Treaty of
Versailles held little hope for lasting European peace. However, a common
perception of Keynes as stoic intellectual might overlook a playful yet powerful
rhetoric present in his writing. Keynes’ literary approach to the problems presented
by the Great War and its aftermath lent greater force to his message. As an example
of Keynes’ literary trickery the following essay takes a brief look at his treatment of
British Prime Minister Lloyd George within a context ofThe Economic
Consequences of the Peace and immediate post-WWI British public opinion.
In 1919, less than one year after the Armistice was signed ending hostilities in
World War One, John Maynard Keynes was the chief British representative on the
Supreme Economic Council during the talks preceding the signing of the Treaty of
Versailles. Keynes had enormous authority to deal with economic elements of the
treaty on behalf of the British Prime Minister. However, when Keynes realized that
his efforts to guide the formation of economic policies were for various reasons
ineffective he resigned his position in the British government and returned to
England. In his Life of John Maynard Keynes, Roy Harrod wrote that “Keynes felt a
personal obligation…to do something at once towards rectifying thesituation.”[iii]
Harrod also wrote that: “It was deep anguish of soul that urged him to write T[ he
Economic Consequences of the Peace]…He did not hesitate to flout the mighty and
to outrage prevailing opinion. He sought to change thatopinion.”[iv] Keynes, a
Cambridge economist and prominent member of the Bloomsbury Group, wrote his
account of events taking place at the Paris Peace Conference and in December 1919,
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The Economic Consequences of the Peace was published.
Keynes faced a difficult task. Not only did he have to counter an economic
element in prevailing British public opinion that Germany could pay the full cost of
the war, he had to overcome a moral element in the rhetoric supporting Prime
Minister Lloyd George’s mandate. Since his direct attempts to steer the formation of
the Treaty of Versailles toward what he felt were reasonable demands had failed,
Keynes chose a more indirect method; he tried to take the wind out of the Treaty
’s
potential success by “tricking the sails” of public opinion that gave Lloyd George and
his government a popular mandate. InStracheyesque style Keynes attacked Lloyd
George, the embodiment of British public opinion, to focus British moral outrage
away from the Kaiser. In this way Keynes could trick the British public into changing
their stance on the economic issues of the Treaty without directly attacking the moral
element in post-war British public opinion.
To understand Keynes’ approach to this issue it is important to understand
where public opinion and politics stood at the end of the Great War. The end of WWI
in November of 1918 brought to British Prime Minister Lloyd George’s coalition
government of a level of insecurity. Although they had been the government that
won the war, Lloyd George felt that attacks from both the political left and right
might weaken his coalition government. In an effort to preserve political unity he
called for a general election hoping that the government
’s success at bringing about
an end to the war would help carry it through an election. Lloyd George wanted a
public mandate when he went to the Paris Peace Conference and he reflected on the
need for such a mandate in his memoirs. “Should hostilities suddenly terminate, it
would be necessary to consult the country as to the line to be taken in making
peace.”[v] By having an election immediately after declaration of the armistice Lloyd
George could take advantage of public sentiment and receive that mandate.
One of the key elements in the election of 1918 was the recent change in
composition of the enfranchised public. The British Reform Bill passed in early 1918
altered the composition of the voting public in such a way that candidates seeking
election had to face the issue of indemnities from Germany. Huge numbers of male
soldiers and sailors serving overseas were given the opportunity to vote, women were
partially enfranchised both directly, because some women gained the right to vote for
themselves, and indirectly since some gained the right to vote for their husbands
through the proxy vote. Parents and other relatives were also allowed to serve as
proxies for soldiers and sailors. All these people were exposed to wartime moral
rhetoric supporting the increases in pensions and disability benefits for soldiers
through the newspapers and other means. The resulting influence of so many people
concerned for the future welfare of the soldiers, their families and the resultant burden
on the taxpayers, meant that in order to get elected and proceed to the formation of
the Treaty of Versailles, Lloyd George had to adopt a campaign platform that
demanded indemnities for the total cost of the war from Germany. To gain a public
mandate for his policies at the peace conferences in Paris Lloyd George and others
desiring to be elected had to work within a moral context to get elected. The build-up
of public sentiment toward the plight of returning soldiers forced potential MPs to
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take a moral stance that was directly connected to reparation economics.It is unlikely
that had anyone else been elected and named Prime Minister they would have been
able to do so without conceding to public demands for the total costs of the war. In
any case, public sentiment for soldiers, sailors and their families developed over the
period from 1916 to 1918 and held sway in the election and subsequently, through
the elected government, at the Paris Peace Conference.
In printed speeches the London Times provided evidence that Lloyd George
was responding to public opinion rather than what might have been his own
misguided beliefs. Over the course of a few weeks Lloyd George’s campaign rhetoric
changed dramatically to account for demands of full indemnities. John Maynard
Keynes outlined this change in The Economic Consequences of the Peace. “In his
speech at Wolverhampton on the eve of the Dissolution (November 24) there is no
word of Reparation or Indemnity…But a few days later at Newcastle (November 29)
the Prime Minister was warming to his work:“When Germany defeated France she
made France pay. That is the principle which she herself has established
…and that is
the principle we should proceed upon—that Germany must pay the costs of the war
up to the limit of her capacity to do so.”[vi] These statements however, were still too
vague for a British public who wanted Germany to pay for the total costs of the war.
The people wanted more concrete assurances that Germany would be held fully
accountable. Even in the early part of December 1918, Lloyd George had still not
said enough to gain public support. On December 8, the London Times wrote that
“The public mind was still bewildered by the Prime Minister
’s various
statements.”[vii] Lloyd George had a vague approach to the issue of reparations
which meant that, according to the Times, he was at risk of losing public support.“It
is the candidate who deals with the issues of to-day who adopts Mr. Barnes’s phrase
about ‘hanging the Kaiser’ and plumps for the payment of the cost of the war by
Germany, who rouses his audience and strikes the notes to which they are most
responsive.”[viii] Three days later the Prime Minister issued a manifesto of six points
that outlined his changed political stance on the issue of reparation.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Trial of the Kaiser.
Punishment of those responsible for atrocities.
Fullest indemnities from Germany.
Britain for the British, socially and industrially.
Rehabilitation of those broken in the war.
A happier country for all.[ix]

Expanding on these issues later in the day at Bristol, Lloyd George outlined three
principles that would guide his indemnity policy.“First, we have an absolute right to
demand the whole cost of the war; second, we propose to demand the whole cost of
the war; and third, a Committee appointed by direction of the Cabinet believe that it
can be done.”[x] Thus it was that, at least according to Keynes,“The ordinary voter
was led to believe that Germany could certainly be made to pay the greater part, if no
the whole cost of the war. Those whose practical and selfish fears for the future the
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expenses of the war had aroused, and those whose emotions its horrors had
disordered, were both provided for. A vote for a Coalition candidate meant the
Crucifixion of Anti-Christ and the assumption by Germany of the British National
Debt.”[xi] Four days later Lloyd George’s coalition government won the election.
Although one may fault him for playing to the crowd, Lloyd George was merely
responding to a sentiment that was already developed in the British public. The
existence of such sentiment at the end of the war meant members of the peace
commission that worked on the Treaty had their hands tied. One of the primary U.S.
delegates to the Paris conference, Colonel House said that“By arousing popular
emotion during the war, an orthodox belligerent measure, they had created a
Frankenstein monster which now held them helpless.”[xii]
To undermine British confidence in the Treaty Keynes developed an intricate
relationship between the three major negotiators, Lloyd George, French Prime
Minister Clemenceau and American President Wilson. Keynes portrayed
Clemenceau as the French embodiment of revenge for German aggressions in the
Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871. Keynes portrayed President Wilson as politically
inept yet a prophet of a new age in international relations. Keynes used Lloyd
George’s actions to set him up as a devious, opportunistic villain who took advantage
of President Wilson and swayed him away from a morally righteous position to the
side of Clemenceau’s immoral revenge. Keynes illustrated how Lloyd George
“bamboozled” President Wilson into acceptingClemenceau’s point of view and how
he subsequently, toward the end of the conference, tried to change Wilson
’s mind
and found out that “it was harder to de-bamboozle this old Presbyterian than it had
been to bamboozle him…”[xiii] By establishing these relationships Keynes provided
the British public with a way to change their political position without necessarily
seeming to be immoral with respect to making the Kaiser pay or inconsiderate of
veterans’ needs. The turnabout in Lloyd George’s position concerning indemnities
reinforced Keynes’s suggestion that the Prime Minister’s political maneuvering was
devious and underhanded. Keynes could bring about public indignation for Lloyd
George’s actions by setting him up as an immoral opportunist and switch British
public focus from a desire to support their veterans to the need to avoid being
collectively vilified in the world political arena through a connection with Lloyd
George. This rhetorical strategy meant that Keynes was trying to get the British
public to disown the embodiment of their own political will and thus make ineffectua
the economic elements of the treaty they had staunchly demanded in 1918.
Although judging Keynes’ direct influence on the British public would
involve a much more detailed study than is possible in a short article, one might hint
at a potential influence on public opinion by establishing the popularity of the book.
Public response to The Economic Consequences of the Peace was astounding. An
international best seller, the book sold 60,000 copies in the first two months, 100,000
copies in the first six months and was translated into fourteen languages. Using
critical reviews to gauge intellectual responses presents a most striking observation;
virtually all reviews mentioned the biographical sketches that Keynes used to attack
public opinion and some reviews attributed the book’s popularity directly to these
sketches. Clyde King of the University of Pennsylvania wrote thatThe Economic
Consequences of the Peace “has attracted world-wide attention because of its
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analysis of Germany’s ability to pay and because of its descriptions of the main
features and the main actors in the world’s greatest drama: the Peace
Conference.”[xiv] Another reviewer expressed a suspicion that“the popularity of his
book is due less to his somber picture of the economic condition of Europe in 1919 or
serious discussion of remedial measures than to the agreeably acid and pointedly
intimate portraits…”[xv] Charles Seymour wrote that “it is the chapter on “The
Conference,” with its vivid and largely imaginative characterization of the Council of
Four, which has caught the attention of the public and chiefly accounts for the wide
sale of the book.”[xvi] Other reactions attested to the potentially long-standing
influence of the biographical sketches.“Mr. Keynes’ picture of the Four in action will
not be forgotten so long as the Congress of Paris is remembered.
”[xvii] An article in
The World Tomorrow added that “History, we believe, will accept as authoritative
Mr. Keynes’ brilliant picture of the Peace Conference and the leading actors in
it.”[xviii] Probably the most positive review was recorded inThe Bookman:
Non–financial and non-economic readers are finding their chief
pleasure in the amazingly outspoken portraits of the so-called“Big
Four”, and these, if vitriolic, have a brilliance than not many men
could out-do.
Few writers could have bettered the portraits of President
Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau. They have all the sharpness
of the brilliant sketch, and, what is more, a suggestive quality which
enables even those who have not been at all behind the scenes, to
visualize the men who took part in the conference. I speak here
entirely as a professional writer, and not at all as a politician.[xix]
Although these reviews do not suggest Keynes’ success at developing a direct
influence upon public opinion they do establish the potential for such influence. This
potential is further strengthened if one considers the expanding British middle class
and increased political role of women; precisely the people who would be most
effected by the terms of the Treaty. Success in averting future war would, as Keynes
pointed out, mean more secure and prolific international trade and a reduced need for
men to leave their homes and die in battle. Perhaps, for this venue, the results of
The
Keynes’ efforts are less significant than his method. What this brief look at
Economic Consequences of the Peace and the resulting reviews illustrates is that
Keynes used narrative methods (the caricatures primarily) in his attempt to bring
about international political and economic change. Since it was obvious to him that
he could neither steer the juggernaut of Europe’s economic will himself nor suggest a
different way to navigate the swells of international political rivalry, Keynes the
trickster chose to “trick the sails” of public opinion in his attempt to bring peace to
Europe.
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